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Indicators and benchmarking initiatives are considered to be powerful instruments for identi-
fying and communicating the need for change and for gauging performance of policy responses. 
During the past few decades, water-related indicators have increasingly broadened their scope 
from merely measuring bio-physical parameters to assessing different aspects of water governance. 
Designing meaningful governance indicators, however, has proven to be a challenging task. In 
this paper we start from an index of information transparency (calculated for Brazil, Portugal and 
Spain) to explore how such an index can contribute to a better understanding of the functioning of 
the water sector in a given country. We argue that, despite all its limitations, a transparency index 
can be a useful entry point for a diagnosis of gaps and strengths of the water sector, provided that 
its interpretation is rooted in the country’s institutional context. Such a diagnosis can reveal that 
the lack of transparency is partially due to the fact that water institutions are still building their 
capacity to reach out to the society or that competences on water issues are distributed among a 
very broad array of actors. Our analysis confirms that the results of governance indices are a double-
edged sword, as they do trigger and feed public debate about institutional reform, but they can also 
become an excuse for implementing superficial changes that merely meet formal requirements.
Keywords: Index, Indicator, Transparency, Water Governance, Participation, Accountability, 
Information
1. Introduction
With the rise of the concept of water governance since the late 1990s, there have been 
many attempts to measure the quality of public and private governance practices in the water 
sector. Typically, benchmarking approaches have been based on the presence and quality of 
key attributes or principles of “good governance”. International organizations have driven the 
selection of those attributes, which include qualities such as equity, rule of law, responsiveness 
or information transparency (see UNDP, 1997; GWP, 2003; WWAP, 2003; OECD, 2015a).
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The debate about the role of information transparency was introduced in the water 
sector by international organizations such as the World Bank and Transparency Interna-
tional, asserting that the access to information is a key element to improve water supply in 
different parts of the world (Asis et al., 2009; Transparency International, 2008). Enabling 
constructive social action, decentralization, and transparency, information disclosure became 
a sine qua non condition to ensure access to water resources (Asthana, 2008; Mitchell, 
2012). This becomes even more relevant in a context where expanding digital resources 
and digital literacy create renewed awareness, attitude and ability of citizens to intervene.
Many of the attempts to assess water governance have opted for using indicators 
and indices (for an overview see OECD, 2015b), as they have the advantage of enabling 
comparison over time and/or among peers, and are powerful communication instruments. 
Indicators are considered to be useful tools to create a baseline, measure performance, 
identify deficiencies, guide reform and capacity building, and assess the effectiveness of 
intervention (Lockwood et al., 2011; Lehtonen et al., 2016). Indicators, however, can only 
be the starting point for further discussion and analysis.
In the case of information transparency, the interpretation of any benchmarking exercise 
triggers a broad array of questions. These include understanding whether pitfalls in access 
to information are due to lack of adequate legal provisions or rather to a problem of capac-
ity; whether they consist in lack of information or rather in lack of relevant information; 
whether the availability of more information online really brings about more democracy; 
and what information gaps tell us about the water sector in a given country. In this context, 
this paper focuses on Brazil, Portugal and Spain to a) explore the challenge of measuring 
information transparency through an indicator-based approach; and b) use the results of 
the assessment to shed light on strengths and weaknesses of water institutions and water 
governance in those countries.
2. The Challenge of Measuring Transparency
The importance of access to information was already present in the concerns of the 
world leaders during the elaboration of the Rio Declaration in 1992, which appointed the 
states as responsible for fostering public awareness and participation by making information 
about environmental issues publicly available (United Nations, 1992). Today, the level of 
information access is translated into transparency, presented as an indicator of the integrity 
and legitimacy of governance practices and as a means for reducing information asymmetry 
and therefore power asymmetry in decision-making processes (Stalgren, 2006).
The introduction of transparency as an indicator of good governance reflects the actual 
political and environmental context (Bouleau et al., 2009; Turnhout et al., 2014). It is a 
central principle of the European Union Aarhus Convention, which states that free access 
to information and the society’s capacity to use it are crucial conditions for environmental 
sustainability (UNECE, 1998). Such understanding reflects the neoliberal approach, in 
which access to information is a cornerstone of democracy, enabling citizens to see what 
goes on in government (Hetherington, 2011); to fight against corruption (Gupta, 2010; 
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Lavalle & Vera, 2011); to share power in decision-making processes that take into account 
different interests and political positions (Agnew, 2011); and to empower marginal social 
actors. In this view, informed citizens and entrepreneurs are able to rationally choose and 
influence political and market options, thus making governments and corporations more 
accountable and efficient (Hetherington, 2011; Petkova et al., 2002).
With the rise of transparency in the policy agenda, several scholars have started ques-
tioning whether more transparency actually means more democracy and better governance. 
Gupta (2008) notices that disclosure of information can easily be manipulated by providing 
biased information or drowning the public with irrelevant or unclear information. Hence, 
the existence of available information is not enough to guarantee informed participatory 
decision-making processes. For instance, it is crucial to consider the format in which the 
information is available, its language, how up to date it is and in which moment it be-
comes available (Mol, 2010). Moreover, information disclosure must be accompanied by 
a guarantee about the quality and reliability of the information provided; the opportunity 
of participating in the processes of decision making; and access to justice when the right to 
information or participation is not granted (De Stefano et al., 2012). The acknowledgment 
of all these caveats should not lead to dismiss the importance of information disclosure. In 
this paper we start from the assumption that information transparency is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for accountability and participation. For this reason, we analyse 
the level of disclosure of information in the broader institutional context and argue that 
reaching a minimum level of information is a first but necessary step to start the debate 
about the quality of disclosed data, and about its contribution to improve water governance.
The use of indicators to trigger change and measure the effectiveness of reforms in water 
and environmental governance has evolved rapidly. Until recently, water- related indicators 
focused mainly on evaluating biochemical and physical aspects of the natural resources, 
assuming that technical approaches were the main ones influencing water availability 
(Fernández, 2014). At present, increased attention is being paid to governance indicators, 
as proved by the OECD Water Governance Initiative, which inventoried 60 initiatives that 
measure different aspects of water governance (OECD, 2015b) and is working toward the 
definition of a set of OECD water governance indicators.
Interestingly, indices to measure information transparency are still limited and gener-
ally focus on the disclosure of fiscal/economic data (for a literature review on the topic see 
Williams, 2015). In the specific case of the water sector, the OECD inventory of governance 
indicators (OECD, 2015b) include very few initiatives that attempt to actually measure 
information transparency. Moreover the existing benchmarking initiatives are mainly fo-
cused on domestic supply and the private sector, as way of increasing the accountability 
and quality of service of water utilities, and very rarely on how water resources are man-
aged (Alegre et al., 2013)
Undoubtedly, measuring political practices through numbers entails risks and important 
limitations. ‘Objective’ indicators usually help to assess details but are not able to identify 
the relevance and meaning of data in a broader context (Veenhoven, 2002). At the same 
time, the variables that compose indicators respond to political agendas. The use of numbers 
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to measure nature and how it is managed creates an opportunity for controlling the access 
to such resources and to implement water markets as proposed by neoliberal water gover-
nance perspectives (Verran, 2010). Moreover, an increasing body of literature questions that 
indicators achieve their intended use. Lehtonen et al. (2016) remark that “indicators can be 
‘misused’, but even when used ‘correctly’, they frequently produce undesirable outcomes: 
they can empower the already powerful, reinforce rather than challenge dominant framings, 
push for premature consensus on the lowest common denominator” (p. 8).
In this paper we acknowledge these limitations and risks, and explore what an in-
formation transparency index can contribute the debate about water institutions and water 
governance in a given country. When using water governance indicators, it is important 
to recognize that numbers are telling just a small portion of the story. Context and expert 
knowledge should complement those numbers to generate a more complete understanding 
of governance practices. In the next sections we will explore how, in the context of water 
governance, the results of an indicator-based assessment of information transparency can 
tell an interesting story when interpreted in a broader context.
3. Methodological Approach
This paper draws from different sources of information and data. First, from the exist-
ing literature about arrangements to promote public participation and information transpar-
ency in the three countries. Second, from outcomes of an assessment of the information 
available online in the three countries, based on a transparency index originally developed 
in Spain (INTRAG, in its Spanish acronym) and adapted to the Brazilian and Portuguese 
contexts for this study. And third, the paper draws from the authors' own experience either 
as academics or as active members of civil society organizations. They contribute to the 
research through their own experience following a participatory methodology that involves 
agents - in this case the authors of this paper - as research partners in the production of 
knowledge (Cornwall & Jewkes, 1995; Bergold & Thomas, 2012).
INTRAG was developed by the NGO Transparency International-Spain in collaboration 
with Spanish water experts to assess the levels of transparency of Spain’s Water Agencies 
(i.e. river basin authorities for rivers crossing several regions, and regional water authorities 
for river belonging to only one region). INTRAG was conceived as an adaptation to the water 
sector of an index of information transparency originally designed to assess transparency 
of Spanish municipal governments. Its creation was motivated by the perception (by the 
Index designers) that the lack of reliable data on water uses contributed to misconceptions 
around water uses and mismanagement of water resources. Thus, its intended purpose 
was to identify gaps in information transparency as a way of triggering change in existing 
practices of pro active information disclosure.
The Index assesses to what extent water agencies make relevant information available 
on their website and is grounded in the awareness that the internet is a powerful tool for 
communication. INTRAG aggregates 80 indicators comprising six areas: Information about 
the Water Agency (WA) (6 indicators); Relationships with stakeholders and the public (14); 
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Transparency in the planning process (16); Transparency on water use and management (22); 
Economic and financial transparency (8); and Transparency in contracts and tenders (14). 
The Index evaluates the presence or absence of relevant information; however, it does not 
assess its quality or easiness of access. Thus, the possible score for each indicator is 1 
(information present) or 0 (absent). The steps followed for the calculation of INTRAG are 
summarized in Figure 1.
In Spain, INTRAG so far has been calculated in 2010, 2011 and 20131. Before 
each rerun indicators were revised in order to address comments and suggestions from 
the assessed water agencies and to adapt to new legal requirements and development. 
Changes never affected more than 20% of the indicators. In Brazil and Portugal, the for-
mat of INTRAG was adapted considering each country’s characteristics. In Brazil, the 
1 INTRAG was conducted in Spain also in 2015, after the submission of this paper. The results of INTRAG 
2015 can be found at http://transparencia.org.es/en/intrag-2015/.
Figure 1. Process to define and apply INTRAG.
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assessment was undertaken in 2013 by a group of experts belonging to the academia and 
with connections with civil society movements2. The Brazilian team adapted the survey 
to the requirements of the Brazilian Water Law and the Access to Information Law. The 
study considered the 26 water state agencies and the federal district as units of analysis 
and included 65 questions. In Portugal, a team of academics and civil society experts 
applied INTRAG in 2014. The Index maintained the structure of its Spanish version 
(80  indicators grouped in 6 areas) while its content was slightly adapted to the Portu-
guese water context. Moreover, the Portuguese team opted to use a fuzzy scale instead of 
a Boolean one3. Moreover, the present Portuguese institutional setting (resulting from a 
merging of regional water authorities into a single national body for Portuguese  mainland 
in 2011) precluded a comparative analysis between the Portuguese five continental river 
basin districts. Hence, the assessment could only consider the Portuguese mainland, man-
aged by the APA (Portuguese acronym for Portuguese Environment Agency), and two 
autonomous Atlantic regions (Madeira and Azores) managed by their respective Regional 
Environment Secretariats.
4. Assessing transparency in water institutions
4.1. Analysis of institutional arrangements for stakeholder participation and  
information transparency
The Brazilian and Spanish systems hold river basins as the unit of water management 
and an important part of stakeholder participation occurs at river basin or at regional scale. 
Besides these local levels, in the three countries participation takes place also at higher 
levels, through the National Water Council and, in the case of Brazil, through the State 
Water Councils.
In Brazil, the 1997 Water Resource Law increased participation of stakeholders in 
decision-making processes, and created the Water Basin Committees. In that context, 
stakeholders collaborate in the elaboration of water management plans and can also influ-
ence decisions. Indeed, in those committees the number of seats for users and civil society 
organizations combined outnumber those of the State, thus granting them decisional power 
if their interests converge on a specific issue (Empinotti et al., 2014).
The membership of Portugal and Spain in the European Union (EU) has a clear influence 
on their participatory provisions, supporting public participation in the management of the 
environment. In addition to several European regulations to ensure a participatory approach 
to environmental governance (Ballester & La Calle, 2015), the 2000 EU WFD establishes 
legal provisions for participation in water resources planning. The Directive states that its 
2 INTRAG in Brazil was conducted also in 2015, the full report can be found at http://artigo19.org/blog/2016/04/28/
transparencia-na-gestao-dos-recursos-hiaricos-no-brasil/
3 Where 0 corresponds to no information found; 0.25: little information found, 0.50: some information found; 
0.75: a good amount of information found; and finally 1.0: comprehensive information found.
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success “relies on close cooperation and coherent action of Community Member State and 
local level as well as on information, consultation and involvement of the public, including 
users” (WFD, 2000: 2) and defines consultation procedures in the process of approval of 
the River Basin Management Plans.
In Spain, water users – mainly farmers and energy industry - have traditionally played 
an active role in the decisions related to the distribution of water and the management of 
water infrastructure, especially at a river basin level, where they have a seat in several 
participatory boards. Other stakeholders beyond water right holders (e.g. civil society 
organizations, recreational users) have very limited influence on decisions at all decision-
making levels (Varela-Ortega & Hernandez-Mora, 2010).
In the Portuguese case, participation beyond the elaboration of River Basin Manage-
ment Plans is limited to two venues: the National Water Council, an advisory body chaired 
by the Ministry of Environment that provides recommendations to water policies and advises 
government decisions; and Regional Water Councils that advise on water management 
plans, promote and monitor the production and dissemination of regional information, and 
participate in water-related programs. Between 2012 and 2015 those Councils were inac-
tive, and were reactivated only recently, to provide advice on the River Basin Management 
Plans published at the end of 2015. In any case, stakeholders represented in the Regional 
Water Councils have little real power of decision.
In parallel to the development of participatory arrangements, the right of access to 
information has been progressively supported by specific legal provisions. In Brazil dis-
closure of environmental information is sought through the 1997 Water Law, which cre-
ated an Information System for organizing and making information available to support 
decision-making processes; and the Access to Environmental Information Law (2003), 
which established that the public agencies belonging to the National Environmental Sys-
tem have to ensure public access to documents and procedures dealing with environmental 
matters. In Portugal and Spain environmental participatory governance stems from the EU 
legislation and the ratification of the Aarhus Convention4 of the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe, whose legal requirements are included in the national legislation 
of the two countries.
At the same time, the right to access information has become institutionalized through 
the creation of a transparency law in the case of Brazil (passed in 2012) and Spain (2013). 
These legal instruments apply to bodies and organizations that are public or receive public 
funds. Their goal is to have information about financial expenses publicly disclosed as well 
as to create channels of communication between the government and citizens to ensure 
access to information.
This section suggests that institutional arrangements in place in Brazil, Portugal and 
Spain support not only participation but also access to information on water management. 
4 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters.
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5 Results are expressed as a percentage of the maximum possible score (i.e. 100% corresponds to having all 
the required information online).
Figure 2. Country results by thematic area. Based on TI Spain (2013) and own results.
However it is necessary to assess to what extent the existing institutional arrangements are 
producing information transparency in practice and what the level of transparency tells us 
about strengths and weaknesses of the water sector 
The overall results of INTRAG show an average score of 64% for Spain, 29% for 
Portugal and 28% for Brazil5 (Figure 2). This suggests that in the three countries, despite 
the existing institutional arrangements, the level of information transparency in the water 
sector in practice is far from sufficient.
The comparison of results by thematic area shows that there are similar trends across 
the three countries. Information about the Water Agency and Relationships with stakeholders 
and the public exhibit high transparency. The first includes information about, for example, 
the structure and responsibilities of the WA, or the composition of its governing bodies, 
while the second area considers the availability of, e.g., information about claims, participa-
tory meetings, and replies to consultation processes. Since these are the least controversial 
aspects of the assessment and since in the three countries public participation is legally 
regulated, a higher performance relative to other areas was expected.
Transparency in the planning process received quite high scores in Spain (93%) and 
Portugal (62%), which can be explained by the WFD legal requirements to elaborate the 
River District Management Plans in consultation with the public. In the three countries, 
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Transparency on water uses and management, Economic and financial transparency and 
Transparency in contracts and tenders are the areas that received the lowest scores. The first 
one includes information about, for example, water right registers, mechanisms of water 
allocations, or the implementation of existing legislation. Information deficiencies in this 
area question the transparency of the whole water sector, as they mean that citizens and 
interested parties have no access to comprehensive information about how water—a public 
good—is used. The other two areas are equally sensitive, as they refer to the financial and 
economic side of water management, and lack of transparency in these areas opens the way 
to misuse of public funds or even corrupt practices. Beyond the results by thematic areas, 
it is interesting to identify issues where there are clear information gaps in each country.
In Brazil Information about the WA and Relationships with stakeholders and the public 
receive relatively high scores, as councils and committees are in place and providing infor-
mation about their activities. Gaps in other areas, such as the inexistence of management 
plans and water pricing, however, point to the fact that those water institutions are still only 
partially working or have a limited scope on important water- related matters. Such reality 
reflects in low scores in the Transparency in the Planning Process area. Thus, rather than 
lack of transparency, the unavailability of information mainly indicates that many gover-
nance instruments such as water resources plans, water licenses or water flows data, still 
do not exist. Low scores in Economic and Financial Transparency, and in Transparency in 
contracts and tenders, can be attributed to the fact that water institutions have little influ-
ence on economic and financial issues and on investments in water infrastructure, which 
are controlled mainly by the energy and water sanitation sectors.
In Portugal the main gaps relate to Economic and financial transparency, and Trans-
parency in contracts and tenders. Gaps are generalized, but most evident on incomes and 
expenditure, in accounting and budgetary information, and in monitoring of public spend-
ing. This area has been subject to intense debate, particularly with regard to public-private 
partnerships, where the Portuguese Court of Auditors found irregularities and excessive 
profits in some business activity related to water supply in Portuguese municipalities 
(Tribunal de Contas, 2014). In the area of Management of water resources and water use lack 
of transparency also stems from recent (2011) political reforms that resulted in substantial 
cuts and changes in water governance that led to the discontinuance of data series, includ-
ing the suspension of the National Inventory of Water Supply and Wastewater Systems. 
The other three areas show a better performance, but still quite low scores. This is partly 
because the non-inclusive and centralist tradition of water authorities remains, and partly 
because water reforms have caused regress in the performance of institutions.
In Spain, in the area of Relations between the public and stakeholders the WAs rarely 
inform citizens about the procedure to follow when they are not granted access to infor-
mation they requested, which is a key component of the legal right to information access. 
In relation to Transparency on water use and management there is a substantial informa-
tion deficiency about water rights and water abstraction statistics (e.g. annual abstracted 
volumes; updated information on existing and new water use permits); compliance with 
existing regulations on water quality; and feasibility reports and cost recovery estimates 
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for new hydraulic infrastructure declared of Public Interest. In the area of Economic and 
financial transparency little information can be found about the level of cost recovery in 
new public works, amount and final use of water tariffs and dues, and budget execution 
by the WA. In Transparency in contracts and tenders, very few WAs provide aggregated 
information about their main contractors and public contracts. Moreover, modifications of 
granted contracts or their actual costs at the end of the contract execution are rarely pub-
lished. This information is particularly useful especially because between 2004 and 2012 
the modification of granted contracts was normal practice, and, on average, the cost of the 
contracts was 29% higher than originally budgeted (Mendez, 2012).
Figures 3, 4 and 5 present the breakdown of the results by assessed region in the three 
countries. While in Brazil and Spain the management unit is the river basin, and information 
is organized accordingly, in Portugal the recent recentralization of the water sector allowed 
the research team to distinguish only the two autonomous Atlantic regions (Madeira and 
Azores) and the Mainland merged data. Thus, the results for Portugal presented in Figure 3 
cannot be used to explore regional differences except for the fact that the two Atlantic 
regions in general fare worse than the Portuguese mainland.
The lower scores of Madeira and the Azores are, at least in part, due to their insular 
condition and the associated difficulties to keep the pace of institutional development of 
the mainland. In both cases, low literacy rates (Pordata, 2014) also explain a lower capacity 
of citizens to intervene. Thus, Portugal’s results reflect a widespread disinvestment in the 
Figure 3. Overall results of the assessment undertaken in Portugal in 2014.
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Figure 4. Overall results of the assessment undertaken in Brazil in 2013. 
water sector and, in particular, in the dissemination of water-related information. With the 
extinction of the regional water agencies on the Portuguese mainland in 2011, the quantity 
and quality of information were further reduced, impacting transparency and the relation-
ship with the public (Schmidt et al., 2015).
In Spain and Brazil, one could try to explain spatial differences based on a number of 
issues, including the level of income of the region, its level of urbanization or its level of 
water scarcity and the associated conflict, or the age of the assessed water agency. When 
observing the maps in Figure 4 and 5, however, these factors do not seem to explain spatial 
trends in a conclusive way.
In Brazil, it was expected that state agencies with a longer history such as in São Paulo 
(SP), Rio Grande do Sul (RS), and Cearã (CE) would obtain scores higher than recently-
created ones, as they may have had time to build their capacity in relation to information 
transparency. Nevertheless, the results did not corroborate this hypothesis, as for instance 
Rio Grande do Sul, which was forerunner in the approval of a state water law, lagged be-
hind in the full development of its water system and this is reflected in its low information 
transparency.
The results of the assessment in Brazil seem to reflect how important the water agenda 
is for each state. For example, in the Amazon region, in the northern part of Brazil, the en-
vironmental agenda is mainly concerned with deforestation and not with water availability. 
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This low priority is consistent with the low transparency scores found in the region. On the 
other hand, water access and availability play an important role in the Brazilian Northeast 
states’ agenda, due to their semi-arid climate and their context of water scarcity. As the 
result, five north-eastern states (Sergipe - SE, Paraiba - PB, Cearã - CE, Pernanbuco – PE, 
and Bahia - BA), have high transparency scores. Finally, since the 1960s the south-eastern 
states have experienced significant pressure on water resources, in terms of quantity and 
quality, due to high concentration of population in the area (São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro), 
intense industrial activity and deficient wastewater treatment. Thus, civil society organiza-
tions vigorously demand governmental response to address those problems, which reflects 
in higher levels of transparency.
As in Brazil, the age or the administrative situation of the Spanish WAs does not seem 
to be a conclusive argument to explain the level of performance in the assessment. For in-
stance, the WAs of Miño-Sil and Cantabrico, who obtain relatively low scores, were recently 
established or restructured, but so was the Andalusian Water Agency, which obtained high 
scores. There is a tendency for regions with higher water stress, on the Mediterranean coast, 
to have a higher level of transparency, but, again, the Bask Water Agency is the exception 
that confirms the rule, being located in the wettest part of Spain and showing very high 
Figure 5. Overall results of the assessment undertaken in Spain in 2013.
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levels of transparency. The correlation between high water stress and high transparency 
levels could sound counterintuitive - the higher the level of conflict the lower could be the 
willingness to share information - but actually can be explained with the fact that civil 
society in water-stressed areas is more active and demanding of information, thus forcing 
the Public Administration to be more transparent. Moreover, since in those regions water is 
high in the political agenda, the Public Administration can be more interested in showing 
its commitment to address water-related issues to its constituency. As a matter of fact, it is 
interesting to analyse Figure 5 in light of the social movements in the different river basin 
districts. Historically the Mediterranean regions have a significant tradition - relatively to 
other regions of Spain - in terms of user organization and water-related citizen movements, 
as expressed by social mobilization in favour and against a highly disputed water transfer 
from the Ebro to the southern part of the Mediterranean coast (Arrojo et al. 2010, p. 251; 
Font & Subirats, 2010) and the presence of several very active water-related citizen plat-
forms in the area.
5. Discussion
5.1 What does the Transparency Index say about transparency in the water sector?
The previous sections show that Brazil, Portugal and Spain align with international trends 
boosting participation and transparency in water management, and have a battery of legal 
provisions to enable them. They also share the questioning of deliberative democracy, as 
expressed in demonstrations against the political establishment, triggered by economic 
recession in Portugal and Spain and, in many other countries worldwide, by the loss 
of trust in the public authorities and the political system. This general disenchantment 
can be felt also among water stakeholders, where the literature reveals that the reach 
of participatory processes falls short of the expectations raised by recent water reforms 
(Wesselink et al., 2011). In this context, the interpretation of the INTRAG results from 
a broader perspective sheds light on achievements and future challenges related to in-
formation transparency.
The low scores in the three countries contrast with the large amount of legislation 
regulating the access to information. Thus, low performance in INTRAG should be ex-
plained by reasons other than the lack of a well-developed regulatory framework. Some 
of them are related to the actual capacity of actors to share information. For instance, the 
authorities in some cases do not share information about a specific issue simply because 
they do not have it. Their monitoring systems can be insufficient or the reporting chain 
be understaffed, thus blocking or delaying the production of information. Moreover, the 
public administration in the three countries is still poorly prepared to share information 
and power over decisions with the civil society. Finally, the civil society itself still has a 
limited tradition in demanding a more active role in decision making and compelling the 
government to be more participative (Schmidt & Guerra, 2010).
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Other reasons are related with the maturity of water institutions and their alignment 
with the requirements of our Index. Thus, while INTRAG is not designed or suitable for 
cross-country comparison6, it is interesting to delve in the reasons why Spain obtained an 
overall average score that doubles those of Brazil and Portugal. First, Spain’s results were 
obtained in the third run of INTRAG (2013), which means that the WAs had had time to 
improve the relatively poor scores received in 2010 and 2011, when the overall score was 
51% and 60%, respectively. Second, Spain has a long tradition in management of water 
resources by river basin, which is the unit of analysis of the Index.
Thus, the agencies hosting the data have well-established web pages and reporting 
mechanisms. On the contrary, water institutions in Brazil and Portugal are relatively young 
and still in process of consolidation. In Brazil water-related data can be found at the site of 
National Water Agency (ANA) and most states have sites where information about water 
resources presents an uneven picture. In Portugal, after a short and fruitful experience of 
decentralization, in 2011the system became again centralized, and in that process a large 
amount of data and information previously available in the web pages of the single River 
Basin Districts was largely taken offline.
An important consideration relates to how higher information disclosure brings 
improved transparency and participation. Several studies have shown that stakeholders in 
the three countries feel frustration about the participatory processes, as they believe that 
critical decisions are still made behind closed doors by members of the traditional water 
policy community (Schmidt et al., 2006, Jacobi, 2004; Guerra, 2011; Empinotti, 2011; 
FNCA 2014; Hernández-Mora et al., 2015). Not even the rapid expansion of Information 
Communication Tools (ICTs) seems to have changed these power balances so far. After 
studying the role of ITCs in empowering citizen water networks, Hernandez-Mora et al. 
(2015) concluded that “without a real willingness to open up true spaces of deliberation 
where all actors can participate in conditions of equality, the role of ICTs will remain one 
of strengthening citizen water networks’ organizational capabilities and ability to obtain 
and generate information, but will not alter the basic framework for water policy making” 
(p. 120). Thus, more information online is no guarantee of real progress toward improved 
participatory practices. Moreover, there must be mechanisms through which citizens can 
claim their right to know if they are denied access to information. To make this possible 
it is also essential that the information takes into account the high degree of illiteracy that 
remains in some social segments, mainly in the most vulnerable social groups, in a time 
when the dynamics of privatization can threaten some successes already achieved in in-
formation availability.
6 As noted by Bellver and Kaufmann (2005) “rather than establishing cross-country comparisons or rankings, 
the main objective of [ …] transparency index is to contribute to the debate and offer a set of indicators so each 
country can monitor progress over time. Only country-specific diagnostics can provide enough detailed institu-
tional information to form the basis for a strategy to improve transparency and accountability in the public sector”
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5.2 What does the Transparency Index say about the functioning of the water sector?
To address this question it is interesting to explore what were the main information gaps 
in each country. As it was said earlier, in the three countries the areas which received the 
lowest scores are Transparency on water uses and management, Economic and financial 
transparency and Transparency in contracts and tenders.
In the Brazilian context, the low performance in information on financing and contracts 
can be explained by the fact that the duties of water institutions are limited to management 
of water infrastructure rather than its construction. The institutional reforms that took place 
in Brazil since the late 1990s maintained decisions over investments and financial resources 
in the hands of sectors such as energy, infrastructure and water supply services. The lack 
of information available on the water agencies’ web pages indicates that, even if the water 
system is shifting toward a participatory model, the states still maintain control of the in-
formation related to decision-making processes. This reveals the fragility of current water 
institutions and their limited capacity to influence decisions over water infrastructure and 
investments made mainly by public enterprises.
In Portugal the poor performance in those areas is due to: i) the persistence in public 
institutions of a modus operandi that does not easily share information with the public; 
ii)  the relatively new tradition of information transparency and the consequent lack of 
 integration in institutional governance routines, where priority has been anti corruption rather 
than broader issues of transparency (Sousa, 2010); iii) the absence of key information in 
water management and monitoring sites, and its dispersion across different institutions not 
linked to water governance; and iv) the political change that took place in 2011, discontinu-
ing the previous administrative setup, and creating additional difficulties in collecting and 
sharing reliable data, which, in turn, increases the mistrust between people and political 
and economic institutions.
In Spain, low performance in the three areas can be explained by several reasons. 
For instance, the complexity of the distribution of competences among different levels of 
the Public Administration, which fall on several branches of the central government, the 
regions and municipalities, makes that data and monitoring activities are dispersed and not 
always harmonized. Moreover, data about actual water abstraction is often still estimated 
and not directly metered, especially in groundwater use (De Stefano et al., 2013). In the 
area of Transparency in contracts and tenders, part of the contracts and tenders falls out-
side the responsibility of the assessed water agencies. Indeed the construction of water 
infrastructure is not always responsibility of those agencies, which, for this reason, do not 
necessarily feel obliged to publish data about the development of construction contracts. 
Moreover, tradition of transparency in this field is still limited, as shown by the fact that, 
where information is available, it is rarely provided in a way that is easily understandable 
by laypeople.
In the three countries, water-related matters span over a wide spectrum of disciplines 
and competences, and decisions about infrastructure and allocation of financial resources 
are made outside the sphere of the water administration. This is relevant to understand 
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where the actual powers steering the water sector reside and, at the same time, results in 
increased opacity of decisions and processes.
5.3 What does the Transparency Index say about governance indicators?
The contrast between well-developed legal frameworks and the poor INTRAG scores 
showcases the importance of moving beyond input-based assessments7.  Indeed, if Spain, 
Portugal and Brazil were to be assessed considering only their regulatory framework, 
they would fare quite well, while the output-based assessment of  INTRAG casts a quite 
different picture. Moreover, the complexity of socioeconomic and  historical development 
behind performance in the assessment underscores the need to use INTRAG for comparison 
of water agencies within the same country rather than across countries.
When interpreting the INTRAG results in connection with other studies that analyse 
in a qualitative way the level of participation and accountability, we realize that there is 
a divide between outputs, measured by INTRAG, and outcomes, i.e. actual transparency. 
Moreover, assessing information transparency means focusing on processes rather than on 
the final outcomes of those processes (e.g. improved water quality) and on the long run 
can contribute to create or consolidate undesired practices. As Gupta (2008, p.4) remarks 
“…processes, once agreed, are subverted by those with the power to deny their original 
intent. One way to do so is to provide too much—rather than too little—of a good thing. 
In the realm of transparency, this could take the form of drowning in disclosure, if recipi-
ents bombarded with large volumes of disclosed information do not know how to find the 
“needle in the hay-stack” or even what to look for”.
Due to the longer trajectory of INTRAG, the case of Spain allows for some con-
siderations about the intended and unintended consequences of the Index. With very few 
exceptions, the assessed WAs accepted to engage in the revision of the preliminary results 
of Index8. Several of them asked for clarification about some of the indicators, added new 
information online and even proposed new indicators to be included in future runs of the 
Index. One agency used the INTRAG thematic areas and indicators to create a specific 
session on transparency in its website and some of the agencies that obtained high scores 
publicly listed their good performance among their institutional achievements. Thus, IN-
TRAG managed to achieve credibility among its main target audience and to create incen-
tives for the agencies to upload relevant information online. Moreover, consulted mid- to 
high ranked officials in some of the WAs acknowledged that they had used INTRAG to 
7 Input indicators measure the presence of enabling conditions to produce a given output and outcome; output 
indicators consider whether laws or policies are being implemented; and outcomes indicators measure the 
actual effect of a policy action on the ground. The first two, in turn, are “process-based indicators”, as they 
assess the process rather than the final outcome and are based on the assumption that if the process follows 
some pre-defined procedures or principles, the desired outcomes will be achieved.
8 As explained earlier, in INTRAG the assessed WAs are invited to revise their preliminary results, prepared 
by the INTRAG team. This gives the WAs an opportunity to point the evaluators to pages that were not found 
during the assessment or even to add information online to improve their final score.
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advocate internally – before their superiors or their peers - the improvement of information 
disclosure practices.
The Spanish experience evidences an important feature of governance indicators: they 
can and actually often intend to modify the reality that they measure (Lehtonen et al., 2016). 
This is particularly true in the case of INTRAG, where the designers meant to maximize 
that catalysing capacity of the index by allowing the assessed agencies to improve their 
performance before the release of the Index results. This is an effective way of increas-
ing the access to relevant information, but also reveals a limitation and potential intended 
consequence of INTRAG that is common to any process-based indicator: a water agency 
can climb up the ranking of transparency by simply adding selected information and data 
to adjust to the Index requirements, without a true institutional transformation toward 
transparency. In other words, the simplified reality provided by indicators can be improved 
with rather superficial changes, leaving the heart of institutions unchanged.
In this context, it is interesting to consider what type of change process-based indicators 
are able to generate. Indeed, “getting the process right” can become “a distraction, divert-
ing time and resources from substantive outcomes that could be the focus of governance 
instead” (Gupta, 2008, p. 4). Moreover, high performance in a process-based indicator can 
contribute to the consolidation of behaviours that the indicator wants to change. Indeed, 
a water agency could use its high scores in INTRAG as an argument for not addressing 
important gaps in other facets of transparency. And in general, there is the risk that focus-
ing on numbers and rankings helps diverting the debate away from the causes of lack of 
transparency. Thus, indicators can contribute to reinforce rationales instead of fostering 
the analysis of the history and the causes of an undesirable practice (Fernandez, 2014).
All this legitimate criticism of process-based indicators leads to ask what should be 
done instead, as seeing the limitations of each analysis tools should not serve as an excuse 
for inaction. In this paper we have attempted to demonstrate that, if those limitations are 
acknowledged and if the Index results are complemented by context information and expert 
knowledge, an output-based transparency index can offer new insights on strengths and weak-
ness of the assessed institutions and also helps spurring debate about information transparency.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we have started from a qualitative overview of legal provisions for 
transparency (which could be seen as an input-based assessment) to setting the scene for 
INTRAG, which can be classified as an output-based indicator. Analysing the results in light 
of other qualitative analyses of public participation and of the authors’ personal knowledge 
of the water sector, has led to several considerations about information transparency and 
its measurement.
It is not possible to establish a clear causal relationship between information trans-
parency and the achievement of management goals. It is however possible to confront the 
increase in data access and participation opportunities due to legal requirements and tech-
nological advances with the perception of stakeholders about their real impact on decisions. 
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Studies in the three countries suggest that increased participation and information access 
have societal benefits such as boosting local capacity and awareness of water management 
challenges. The limited impact of citizens on final decisions, however, also creates frustra-
tion and distrust in participatory processes. In other words, advances in participation and 
transparency are seen as positive but not as ‘game changers’.
The case of INTRAG has shown that information transparency indicators can become 
an instrument for stirring debate and further reflection on the reality, both for researchers 
and for actors in the water sector. Moreover, they can act as incentives for increasing the 
amount of information released by the water authorities, which is a first but necessary step 
to start the debate about the quality and reliability of the collected data.
Indicators of information transparency have clear risks, such as self-complacence 
of the assessed organizations or when they are used to focus the public attention to a very 
specific aspect of water governance while diverting the debate from what really matters. 
To contain these risks it is crucial to make clear that indicators are a means and not a goal 
by themselves and that their value cannot be oversold. It would be naive to believe that 
once the water authorities have achieved high scores in INTRAG they can be considered 
to be fully transparent. We have argued that the problem does not lay in using indicators 
but rather in overrating the significance of numbers and interpreting them from a narrow 
perspective. Thus, while it is necessary and legitimate to criticize indicators, their contribu-
tion to create debate and trigger change can compensate for their inevitable simplification 
of the reality.
The interpretation of the INTRAG results from a broader perspective contributes 
to detect pitfalls in the functioning of water institutions. For instance, informed public 
participation is hampered by deficient information disclosure, despite the battery of legal 
instruments to ensure it. In some cases, this is due to lack of political will. In others, the 
water authorities are not able to share relevant information or engage stakeholders in 
 decision-making  processes because some key decisions about water are actually made out-
side of the water sector. Finally, lack of transparency at times is actually lack of capacity: 
if the water authorities have not well-established monitoring systems or have no resources 
to make information and data publicly available, the final result will be opaque institutions.
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